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Abstract
In May 2015, in an effort to foster peace in the restive Papua and West Papua Provinces, Indonesian President
Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo granted clemency to five political prisoners, releasing them from sentences ranging from
20 years to life. The president also stated that there would be ‘a follow-up granting clemency or amnesty to
other [political prisoners] in other regions’ (Jakarta Post, 10 May 2015). However, with up to 50 political
prisoners still incarcerated in prisons around Indonesia (mostly Papuan and Moluccan separatists), Jokowi’s
selective release policy faces several legal and political obstacles. This article outlines the various options
open to Jokowi in facilitating future political prisoner releases (including amnesty, clemency, remissions and
conditional release), the advantages and disadvantages of each, before suggesting an acceptable way forward
for all parties.
Keywords: amnesty, clemency, Indonesia, political prisoners, West Papua, Maluku, transitional justice,
forgiveness

Abstrak
Pada Mei 2015, dalam upaya untuk mencapai perdamaian di Provinsi Papua dan Papua Barat, Presiden
Indonesia Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo memberikan grasi kepada lima narapidana politik, melepaskan mereka
dari hukuman yang beragam dari mulai 20 tahun hingga seumur hidup. Presiden juga menjelaskan bahwa
akan ada pemberian grasi atau amnesti kepada narapidana politik di wilayah lain’ (Jakarta Post, 10 Mei
2015). Namun demikian, dengan masih adanya 50-an narapidana politik masih dipenjara di lembaga
pemasyarakatan di seluruh Indonesia (paling banyak separatis Papua dan Maluku), kebijakan pelepasan
Jokowi menghadapi beberapa tantangan hukum dan politis. Tulisan ini membahas pilihan terbuka bagi
Jokowi untuk memfasilitasi pelepasan narapidana politik (termasuk amnesti, grasi, remisi, dan pembebasan
bersyarat), keuntungan dan kerugian masing-masing cara, sebelum memberikan jalan yang dapat diterima
oleh seluruh pihak.
Kata kunci: amnesti, grasi, Indonesia, narapidana politik, Papua Barat, Maluku, keadilan transisional,
pemaafan
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I. INTRODUCTION

DANIEL PASCOE

On 9 May 2015, in an effort to foster peace in the restive Papua and West Papua
Provinces, Indonesian President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo granted executive clemency
to five political prisoners.2 Apotnaholik Lokobal, Linus Hiluka and Kimanus Wenda
had each been sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, while Numbungga Telenggen
and Yafrai Murib were both sentenced to life imprisonment.3 The five men were
released as Jokowi handed them documents confirming that the remainder of their
prison sentences would be set aside. At the time, the release of the five prisoners was
publicly interpreted as a symbolic move towards reconciliation with the Free Papua
Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka - OPM) in Indonesia’s Papua and West Papua
provinces,4 while the president also stated that there would be ‘a follow-up granting
clemency or amnesty to other [political prisoners] in other regions’.5 However, with up
to 50 political prisoners still incarcerated in prisons around Indonesia as of February
2016 (primarily Papuan and Moluccan independence activists imprisoned for treason
or rebellion after peacefully expressing their political views),6 Jokowi’s release policy
2
The term ‘political prisoner’ has no standard international definition, although NGO Papuans
Behind Bars has put forward a definition applicable to the Indonesian context, based upon a 2012 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution. Here, political prisoners:
include those prisoners where there is reason to believe that they have been detained for exercising
rights and freedoms which are guaranteed in Indonesia’s Constitution [particularly Article 28(E)(2)-(3)],
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international instruments which Indonesia has
signed up to.
(“No Political Prisoners? The suppression of political protest in West Papua April 2013,” Tapol,
April 2013, accessed 27 January 2017, http://tapol.org/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/pdfs/
Suppression%20of%20political%20protest%20in%20West%20Papua.pdf.)
Human Rights NGO Amnesty International, on the other hand, prefers the term ‘prisoner of conscience’:
[A] person imprisoned or otherwise physically restricted because of their political, religious or
other conscientiously held beliefs, ethnic origins, sex, colour, language, national or social origin, economic
status, birth, sexual orientation or other status – who has not used violence or advocated violence or hatred. The organization calls for their immediate and unconditional release.
(Amnesty International, Indonesia: Jailed for Waving a Flag – Prisoners of Conscience in Maluku
(AI-Index: ASA 21/008/2009 (2009)), accessed 24 September 2016, http://www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/
dateien/indonesia_ai_2009_jailed_waving_flag.pdf, p.6)
3
Ina Parlina and Nethy Dharma Somba, “In Papua, Jokowi frees 5,” The Jakarta Post (10 May 2015).
4
Indonesian NGO staff, personal interview, Oslo, Norway, 23 June 2016; “Indonesian President Joko
Widodo grants clemency to Papuan political prisoners,” ABC News (9 May 2015), accessed 29 January 2017,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-09/indonesian-leader-grants-clemency-to-papuan-political-prisoners/6457862. The Organisasi Papua Merdeka is a Papuan rebel group that has been campaigning against
Indonesian sovereignty over what are now West Papua and Papua provinces since 1965.
5
Parlina and Somba, “In Papua, Jokowi frees 5”; Ina Parlina, “Govt to take ‘soft approach’ in Papua,”
The Jakarta Post (5 January 2016). Conversely, Harsono asserts that the Indonesian government has
not fully explored a release strategy for Moluccan political prisoners, having only considered amnesty
and clemency for Papuans (Andreas Harsono, “Indonesia’s Forgotten Political Prisoners,” Jakarta Globe
(16 March 2016), accessed 28 January 2017, http://jakartaglobe.id/opinion/commentary-indonesiasforgotten-political-prisoners/).
6
Yohannie Linggasari, “Amnesty International: Jokowi Gagal Penuhi Perlindungan HAM,” CNN
Indonesia (24 February 2016), accessed 16 September 2016, http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasion
al/20160224164145-20-113236/amnesty-international-jokowi-gagal-penuhi-perlindungan-ham/.
Separate but more recent reports place the numbers at 28 Moluccan prisoners in March 2016, and 17
remaining prisoners in Papua and West Papua in September 2016. See Harsono, “Indonesia’s Forgotten
Political Prisoners” and “Update on Political Prisoners in Papua,” Papuans Behind Bars (September 2016),
accessed 28 January 2017, http://www.papuansbehindbars.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/PBB-JulySeptember-2016.EN_.pdf.
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still faces significant obstacles. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), Indonesia’s
lower house of parliament, has thus far refused to endorse any general amnesty for
rebel groups, for fear of legitimising their activities. Moreover, many of Indonesia’s
political prisoners are loathe to admit guilt so as to receive executive clemency for
offences that they either a) did not commit and/or b) do not seek to legitimise. In
January 2017, at the time of writing, both sides still remain at an impasse, wary of
condoning the other’s activities.

This article discusses a way forward on political prisoner releases in Indonesia. I
begin by clarifying the legal scope of Indonesia’s clemency and amnesty laws based
upon textual interpretation, prior state practice, as well as relevant theoretical and
comparative literature. I particularly focus on the role played, if any, by forgiveness
when clemency and amnesty are granted to prisoners. I then proceed to outline
the various options open to Jokowi in facilitating future political prisoner releases
(including amnesty, clemency, remissions and conditional release), the advantages
and disadvantages of each, before finally suggesting an acceptable way forward for
all parties.
II. CLEMENCY, AMNESTY AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

FORGIVENESS

IN

THEORETICAL

AND

Clemency and amnesty are terms whose precise definition may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, in its technical legal meaning, ‘clemency’
encompasses a wide variety of lenient actions by the executive branch when dealing
with a conviction and punishment pronounced by the judiciary.7 The most familiar
examples of clemency are pardon (an order releasing the prisoner from incarceration
altogether, and perhaps also restoring the prisoner’s good name and civil rights), and
commutation (whereby the prisoner’s sentence is reduced, or is altered to a different
type, for example from a death sentence to a life sentence).8 Some jurisdictions enable
clemency in these forms to be granted unilaterally, whereas others require that the
prisoner address a petition to the relevant clemency decision maker (usually the head
Under Indonesian law, treason and rebellion are known as makar (Indonesia, Kitab Undang-Undang
Hukum Pidana (Indonesian Criminal Code), UU No. 27 Tahun 1999 (Law Number 27 Year 1999), art. 106,
108, 110), with the completed offence carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Article 106
states: ‘an attempt undertaken with intent to bring the territory of the state wholly or partially under
foreign domination or to separate part thereof shall be punished by life imprisonment or a maximum
imprisonment of twenty years.’
During the Dutch colonial era, the original application of these provisions was to violent protests or
demonstrations, but since 2003, peaceful protestors have also been prosecuted under this provision in
both Papua and in Maluku (Indonesian NGO staff #2, personal Interview, Jakarta, Indonesia, 11 October
2016; “About the Data (September 2016),” Papuans Behind Bars, accessed 27 January 2017, http://www.
papuansbehindbars.org/?page_id=315). The provisions’ vague nature opens them to exploitation by police
and prosecutors (Amnesty International, Indonesia: Jailed for Waving a Flag, p.13), such that acts including raising a flag associated with regional independence can be prosecuted as makar. Both the Papuan
Morning Star Flag and the Benang Raja (Rainbow) flag of the Republic of South Maluku are banned by the
Indonesian government, in addition to other symbols of separatist movements (Parlina and Somba, “In
Papua, Jokowi frees 5”; Indonesia, Peraturan Pemerintah Tentang Lambang Daerah (Government Regulation
on Regional Symbols), PP No. 77 Tahun 2007 (Government Regulation Number 77 Year 2007)).
7
Sarah Lucy Cooper, “The State Clemency Power and Innocence Claims: The Influence of Finality
and Its Implications for Innocents,” Charlotte Law Review 7 (2015): 52 n 5; Dan Markel, “Against Mercy,”
Minnesota Law Review 88 (2004): 1440.
8
Andrew Novak, Comparative Executive Clemency: The Constitutional Pardon Power and the
Prerogative of Mercy in Global Perspective (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p.4.
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Amnesty, on the other hand, denotes a mass grant of leniency, awarded based
on prisoner categorisation, and issued by the executive or legislative branch of
government.10 Importantly, the amnesty decision maker generally takes little regard
of each prisoner’s individual characteristics.11 As such, amnesty operates as more of a
political tool than does clemency. Amnesty reduces or abrogates criminal punishments
for what are frequently political ends,12 and while clemency may be granted by an
executive authority for precisely the same political reasons,13 clemency is also
frequently dispensed on retributive grounds (i.e., due to excessive or unwarranted
punishment), or as a redemptive reward for prisoner rehabilitation or prior national
service.14
Both academic scholarship as well as state practice remain conflicted on clemency
and amnesty’s relationship with guilt and innocence. There are two possible
consequences of a clemency grant: first, where clemency cancels or reduces only
punishment, without erasing the prisoner’s guilt for the offence (which may or may
not be accompanied by the prisoner’s civil rights being restored); and second, where
executive clemency completely vindicates by putting the prisoner back in the same
position as if the crime had never been committed, by erasing both the punishment
and the prisoner’s conviction.15 Recalling the two most familiar examples of executive
clemency, all commutations maintain guilt. Moreover, with its plain English meaning,
the word ‘pardon’ also implies the same: that the still-guilty defendant is extended
leniency by the state as a gift, rather than a revocation of punishment due to
innocence.16 Although pardons are sometimes extended throughout the world for
innocence (occasionally referred to as ‘free pardons’),17 this practice arguably arises

9
Leslie Sebba, “The Pardoning Power – A World Survey,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
68(1) (1977): 113-114, 116. See Novak, Comparative Executive Clemency, pp. 15, 19-20, 33, 140, 149, 174,
183, 187, for examples.
10
Leslie Sebba, “Clemency in Perspective,” in Criminology in Perspective: Essays in Honour of Israel Drapkin, ed. Simha F. Landau and Leslie Sebba (Lexington Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1977), p.
232; Markel, “Against Mercy,” p. 1140; Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions:
Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), pp. 6, 31-34.
11
Josepha Close, “Amnesty Provisions in the Constitutions of the World: A Comparative Analysis,”
International Law Blog (5 January 2015), accessed 21 September 2016, https://aninternationallawblog.
wordpress.com/2015/01/05/amnesty-provisions-in-the-constitutions-of-the-world-a-comparativeanalysis/.
12
Scott Veitch, “The Legal Politics of Amnesty,” in Lethe’s Law: Justice, Law and Ethics in Reconciliation,
ed. Emilios Christodoulidis and Scott Veitch (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), p.34; Mallinder, Amnesty,
Human Rights and Political Transitions, p.4.
13
Austin Sarat, Mercy on Trial: What it Means to Stop an Execution (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2005), pp.20-21.
14
See generally Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy and the Public Interest (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989) and ibid., pp. 23, 96, 108-109.
15
Louise Mallinder, “Power, Pragmatism, and Prisoner Abuse: Amnesty and Accountability in the
United States,” Oregon Review of International Law 14 (2012): 320; Jennifer Schweppe, “Pardon me: the
contemporary application of the prerogative of mercy,” Irish Jurist 49 (2013): 222-223.
16
Samuel Williston, “Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?” Harvard Law Review 7 (1915): 648; Adam Sitze,
“Keeping the Peace,” in Forgiveness, Mercy, and Clemency, ed. Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain (Stanford
California: Stanford University Press, 2007), p.159.
17
Sebba, “Clemency in Perspective,” p. 229; Novak, Comparative Executive Clemency, pp.87, 159
(generally); Daniel T. Kobil, “Chance and the Constitution in Capital Clemency Cases,” Capital University
Law Review 28 (2000): 572; Mallinder, “Power, Pragmatism, and Prisoner Abuse,” p. 7 (US States); Michael
Naughton, “Conclusion,” in The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Hope for the Innocent, ed. Michael
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from the executive performing a judicial function. A pardon for innocence is, to quote
Stephen, ‘an exceedingly clumsy mode of procedure’.18 Likewise for Hoffstadt: in the
United States context, despite the US Supreme Court’s endorsement of clemency as a
‘fail safe’ procedure in Herrera v Collins,19 ‘clemency is not currently designed to serve
as an extrajudicial corrective mechanism.’20 Novak neatly summarises the views of
academic commentators:
While undoubtedly an important part of post-conviction relief in claims of
actual innocence, scholars have noted that the clemency and pardon power is
likely an insufficient safeguard, on its own, to adequately protect the right of the
innocent.21
As criminal justice systems have developed more advanced measures to review
convictions and individualise sentences such as multiple levels of appeals, general
defences to liability, discretionary sentencing, parole and post-conviction review, the
executive’s need to resort to pardon for innocence or to commutation for excessive
punishment has been much reduced.22

Amnesty attracts similar controversy. Amnesty’s primary modern function is to
allow the state to ‘keep the peace,’23 although amnesty has also been used to celebrate
important national events, reduce prison overcrowding, endear political subjects to
the sovereign, to transition from autocracy to democracy, to populate colonies, and
to provide manpower for armies and industrial projects.24 With present significance,
amnesty was historically the power used to remit punishment in the case of political
crimes,25 to the exclusion of clemency. Although the word ‘amnesty’ comes from the
Greek word amnestia meaning ‘forgetfulness’, a mass grant of amnesty may or may
not carry with it the implication of guilt.26 If it is an unconditional amnesty, the granter
of the amnesty is suspending judgment on guilt or innocence.27 This kind of amnesty
‘does not entail that any of the parties accept responsibility for wrongs done, detail
Naughton (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 226 (United Kingdom); Lynne Weathered, “Pardon
Me: Current Avenues for the Correction of Wrongful Conviction in Australia,” Current Issues in Criminal
Justice 17 (2005-2006): 203-216 (Australia).
18
James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol.1 (London: Macmillan and
Company, 1883), p.312.
19
Herrera v Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
20
Brian M. Hoffstadt, “Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power,” Texas Law Review 79 (2001): 572,
588.
21
Novak, Comparative Executive Clemency, p.88.
22
Ibid., pp. 5-6.
23
P.E. Digeser, “Forgiveness & the Law: Executive Clemency and the American System of Justice,”
Capital University Law Review 31 (2003): 161-178, 174; Sitze, “Keeping the Peace,” p.158.
24
James R. Acker and Charles S. Lanier, “May God – Or the Governor – Have Mercy: Executive Clemency
and Executions in Modern Death Penalty Systems,” Criminal Law Bulletin 36(3) (2000): 201; Daniel T. Kobil,
“How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times,” Capital University Law Review 31 (2003): 222; William A.
Schabas, “Conjoined Twins of Transitional Justice - The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004): 1086-1087; Linda Ross Meyer,
“The Merciful State,” in Forgiveness, Mercy and Clemency, ed. Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain (Stanford
California: Stanford University Press, 2007), p.74; Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy and the Public Interest,
pp. 90, 199.
25
Sitze, “Keeping the Peace,” p.209; Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions, p.6;
Michigan Women’s Justice & Clemency Project, “Clemency Manual: Chapter II – Introduction to Clemency
(2008),” University of Michigan, accessed 27 January 2017, http://umich.edu/~clemency/clemency_mnl/
ch2.html.
26
Digeser, “Forgiveness & the Law,” p. 173; Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions,
p.6.
27
Digeser, “Forgiveness & the Law,” pp.174-175; Sitze, “Keeping the Peace,” p.168.
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the nature of those wrongs, or compensate the victims for their suffering.’28 As Digeser
suggests, ‘The beauty and danger of an [unconditional] amnesty is that because the
past is not dredged up, no official determination is made as to which party is correct.’29
Accordingly, it is inaccurate to suggest that an unconditional amnesty re-establishes
complete innocence. Yet nor do unconditional amnesties maintain the protagonists’
guilt either.30 The alleged crime is merely ‘forgotten’ to promote utilitarian objectives.31

On the other hand, if it is a conditional amnesty that releases prisoners or
precludes future prosecution, the effect may be no different from that of clemency,
described above - ‘conditional’ amnesty may merely be a more efficient means of
granting pardon or commutation to many hundreds or thousands of prisoners at once.
As with the widely-respected South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
conditional amnesties may require the recipients to reveal the full extent of their
involvement in the crime in order to enjoy lenient treatment.32 Conditional amnesties
may also be granted in exchange for some further act or omission on the part of the
recipient. Leniency may be contingent ‘on any number of things, including payment of
restitution or reparations, agreement not to hold positions of public trust, and public
and personal apologies for criminal behavior.’33 If the conditions attached require
an admission of criminality, conditional amnesty actually confirms guilt, instead of
eliminating it.
What role does forgiveness play in granting clemency or amnesty? Although
certain authors assert that forgiveness may only be granted by victims of crimes as
private individuals, rather than by the state,34 other academic commentators believe
that both clemency and conditional amnesty as acts of the state may be interpreted as
measures of official, collective forgiveness.35 In a criminal justice context, forgiveness
may be defined as a desire to remit punishment that is otherwise justly due.36 It
may also be defined as dispensing with any ill feelings toward the accused (such as
Digeser, “Forgiveness & the Law,” p.173.
Ibid., p.175; Markel, “Against Mercy,” p.1140 n61.
30
Sitze, “Keeping the Peace,” p.159.
31
Contrast Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions, p.5.
32
Veitch, “The Legal Politics of Amnesty,” p.39; Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political
Transitions, p.15.
33
Shawn Fields, “Private Crimes and Public Forgiveness: Towards a Refined Restorative Justice
Amnesty Regime,” International Journal of Civil Society Law (2007): 11.
34
Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy and the Public Interest, p.184; Martha Minow, “Keynote Address:
Forgiveness and the Law,” Fordham Urban Law Journal 27, no.5 (2000): 1401, 1404; Austin Sarat and Nasser
Hussain, “Toward New Theoretical Perspectives on Forgiveness, Mercy and Clemency: An Introduction,”
in Forgiveness, Mercy and Clemency, ed. Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain (Stanford California: Stanford
University Press, 2007), p.5.
35
Digeser, “Forgiveness & the Law,” pp.166, 173; Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy and the Public
Interest, p.183; Hussain and Sarat, “Toward New Theoretical Perspectives,” p. 3; Meir Dan-Cohen, “Revising
the Past: On the Metaphysics of Repentance, Forgiveness, and Pardon,” in Forgiveness, Mercy and Clemency,
ed. Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2007), p.133. Note also
Mallinder’s assertion that:
A government choosing to forgive crimes against the state is not particularly
problematic as the state has standing to do so. But a state encouraging individuals to
forgive one another is contentious [Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political
Transitions, p.56.].
36
Digeser, “Forgiveness & the Law,” p.167; Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy and the Public Interest;
Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions; Bas van Stokkom, Neelke Doorn and Paul van
Tongeren, “Public Forgiveness: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives,” in Public Forgiveness in Post-Conflict
Contexts, ed. Bas van Stokkom, Neelke Doorn and Paul van Tongeren (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), p.3.
28
29
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resentment), regardless of whether the original punishment remains.37 Either way,
forgiveness evidently depends on guilt, as it is a forward-looking response to past
wrongdoing.38 The state can only forgive if the alleged perpetrator admits his or her
guilt to the public, either implicitly or explicitly. As Digeser suggests:
[P]art of what is assumed in this communication [between the government
decision-maker on clemency or amnesty and the offender] is a common, public
understanding of who did what to whom. Without such a common understanding,
the [state, as a] victim could ‘forgive’ the offender for an offense that he or she may
not have committed. And, to forgive an innocent individual is a misrepresentation
and an insult. In this small way, political forgiveness in general requires a minimal
level of justice in discerning the history of what happened.39
Forgiveness’ inherent link to guilt is a recurring theme throughout this article.
While not all grants of clemency might be framed as ‘political forgiveness,’ Indonesia’s
own legislation indeed suggests this kind of model, as I now move on to explain.

III. CLEMENCY, AMNESTY, REMISSIONS AND CONDITIONAL RELEASE IN THE
INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Within this theoretical model I situate the Indonesian legislative and constitutional
system of discretionary leniency. At the time of the clemency grants he made to the
five Papuan prisoners in May 2015, Jokowi’s stated preference was to release many of
Indonesia’s remaining political prisoners as gesture of goodwill, in order to promote
peace in restive outlying provinces such as Papua, West Papua and Maluku.40 What
further options does the Indonesian president have to do so, and which legal and
political consequences flow from each? Within this section I present the four available
solutions: clemency, amnesty, remissions and conditional release.

Article 14 of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution sets out a number of quasi-judicial
powers available to the president, exercisable via Keputusan Presiden (Presidential
Decree). Each of the powers is a means of providing immunity from the effects of
criminal litigation. The most common of these, clemency (grasi), involves the
alteration, reduction or abrogation of criminal punishment, and is prominently used
to convert a death sentence to life imprisonment. Although it can be granted at any
stage after conviction at first instance, prisoners frequently await the result of their
final appeal before petitioning the president for clemency.41 Amnesty (amnesti)
operates in a similar manner to clemency, but is employed to release an entire class of
prisoners from incarceration.42 Amnesty may be granted before or after a conviction,
with present DPR lawmakers preferring the latter approach.43 Rehabilitation
(rehabilitasi) is granted in order to restore the civil rights of a person previously
37
Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy and the Public Interest, pp.184, 186; Minow, “Keynote Address,”
p.1402; Markel, “Against Mercy,” p.5; Hussain and Sarat, “Toward New Theoretical Perspectives,” p.4.
38
Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy and the Public Interest, p.186.
39
Digeser, “Forgiveness & the Law,” p.166.
40
Parlina and Somba, “In Papua, Jokowi frees 5”.
41
Amnesty International, “Recent Executions in Indonesia and the Application of the Death Penalty,”
in Law and Political Liberty in Indonesia, ed. Indonesia Publications (Lanham-Seabrook MD: Indonesia Publications, 1988), p.6.
42
Tim Lindsey and Pip Nicholson, Drugs Law and Legal Practice in Southeast Asia: Indonesia,
Singapore and Vietnam (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016), p.104.
43
Nurul Fitri Ramadhani, “Aceh Militants to be Granted Amnesty Despite Objections,” The Jakarta
Post (22 July 2016).
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accused of criminal offences.44 Abolition (abolisi) resembles amnesty, but is only
granted before conviction, while the case against a prisoner is still pending.45 As this
article focuses on political prisoners still incarcerated in the Papua, West Papua and
Maluku provinces, amnesti and grasi are the presidential powers worth considering
in greater detail.
Unusually, given the legislature’s primary decision-making role in 79 of the 105
national constitutions that mention amnesty and clemency powers, Indonesia’s 1945
Constitution vests both the clemency and the amnesty powers in the president.46
At first glance, Indonesia’s constitutional quasi-judicial powers appear highly
centralised, alongside 13 similar jurisdictions where the head of state holds similar
entitlements.47 However, Article 14 of the Indonesian Constitution also mandates
that the president pay regard to the advice of the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung)
when granting clemency or rehabilitation, and equally to heed the advice of the DPR
when granting amnesty or abolition. Moreover, the president routinely consults other
parties for advice on clemency petitions, albeit as a matter of practice rather than
law.48 Indonesia’s constitutional scheme therefore combines features of common
law jurisdictions such as the United States and Singapore (where the head of state
holds the pardon power, but where no constitutional ‘amnesty’ provisions exist), with
those of civil law nations such as France and Russia, where constitutional amnesty is
frequently granted by the legislature.49 Although several other civil law jurisdictions
such as Finland, Greece and Suriname require the head of state to consider the
views of the judiciary before issuing pardons, throughout the world only Indonesia’s
constitutional system contains provision for the head of state to consider non-binding
advice on amnesty from the legislature.50
As for recent Indonesian practice using the clemency and amnesty powers,
although he has steadfastly refused to grant clemency for any prisoners sentenced to
death for drug trafficking,51 Jokowi has already commuted the death sentences of five
murder convicts (with a total of five petitions granted and 23 rejected in death penalty
cases through to February 2016),52 and in December 2014 released agricultural
Lindsey and Nicholson, Drugs Law and Legal Practice in Southeast Asia, p.104.
Lindsey and Nicholson, Drugs Law and Legal Practice in Southeast Asia, p.104.
46
Close, “Amnesty Provisions in the Constitutions of the World”. Indonesia is one of only 13 states
with similar constitutional arrangements.
47
Ibid. The other jurisdictions with similar arrangements are Bhutan, Bolivia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Eritrea, Iceland, Japan, Monaco, Myanmar, Slovakia, Spain and Turkmenistan.
48
The president also receives advice on clemency from parties such as the coordinating minister
for security; the minister for law and human rights; the attorney-general; the secretary of state; the chief
of state; the cabinet secretary; the ministry of foreign affairs; the national police force and the vice-president, depending on the case under consideration (Former Indonesian civil servant, personal interview,
Melbourne, Australia, 21 November 2016; Australian academic expert on Indonesia, personal telephone interview, 30 January 2013; Indonesian civil servant, personal interview, Jakarta, Indonesia, 15 April 2013).
49
Close, “Amnesty Provisions in the Constitutions of the World”; Novak, Comparative Executive
Clemency, pp. 8-9.
50
See Constitution of Finland 1999, art.105; Constitution of Greece 2001, art. 47(1); Constitution of
Suriname 1987, art. 109.
51
Margareth Aritonang and Slamet Susanto, “Jokowi to ban clemency for drug convicts,” The Jakarta
Post (10 December 2014), accessed 29 January 2017, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/12/10/
jokowi-ban-clemency-drug-convicts.html.
52
Ade Mulyana, “KIP Sidangkan Setneg Soal Transparansi Pemberian Grasi,” RMOL (15 February
2016), accessed 17 September 2016, http://hukum.rmol.co/read/2016/02/15/235813/KIP-SidangkanSetneg-Soal-Transparansi-Pemberian-Grasi-.
44
45
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rights activist Eva Susanti Bande from prison through the use of clemency.53 Mostly
recently, in January 2017 Jokowi reduced by six years the 18-year prison sentence of
former Anti-Corruption Commission Chairman Antasari Azhar, who was convicted of
murder.54 Although in November 2015 the Ministry of Law and Human Rights tabled
a proposal to release 20,000 minor drug offenders from prison,55 and in July 2016
the DPR recommended the release from prison for a group of up to 70 former rebels
from Aceh,56 Jokowi has not yet granted amnesty during his two and a half years as
president.57
Academic commentators cannot be absolutely certain of the factors justifying
clemency in previous Indonesian cases, given that the president’s official reasoning,58
and since 2016 the decree itself, have not always been released to the public.59
Nonetheless, clemency has been granted by post-1998 Reform-era (Reformasi)
Presidents B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono and Jokowi for reasons such as:

a. to free prisoners convicted of subversion during the Suharto ‘New Order’
administration from 1967-1998,60 and ‘rebellion’ during the Reformasi period
(discussed below),61 in order to make peace with critics and rebel groups, and
as part of Indonesia’s ongoing democratisation;
b. to maintain good relations with foreign nations;62

53
“Alasan Jokowi Beri Grasi ke Eva Susanti Bande,” Tempo (22 December 2014), accessed 17
September 2016, https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2014/12/22/063630205/alasan-jokowi-beri-grasi-keeva-susanti-bande.
54
“Jokowi Kabulkan Grasi Eks Ketua KPK Antasari, Ini Alasannya,” Tempo (25 January 2017); “Jokowi
Grants Antasari Azhar’s Clemency Application,” Tempo (25 January 2017).
55
“Kemarin Hukuman Mati, Kini 20.000 Napi Narkoba Diusulkan Dapat Grasi,” Solopos (3 November
2015), accessed 17 September 2016, http://www.solopos.com/2015/11/03/kasus-narkoba-kemarinhukuman-mati-kini-20-000-napi-narkoba-diusulkan-dapat-grasi-657912.
56
Marguerite Afra Sapiie, “House agrees to amnesty for surrendered Aceh rebels,” The Jakarta Post
(22 July 2016), accessed 28 January 2017, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/07/22/houseagrees-to-amnesty-for-surrendered-aceh-rebels.html.
57
Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights, “Amnesti Indonesia Dataset,” (Unpublished list of
historical Amnesty grants, 2016, copy on file with the author). At the time of writing in January 2017, the
‘amnesty’ for which Jokowi is best known for, Indonesia’s Tax Amnesty, was actually enacted as a piece of
legislation by the DPR on 28 June 2016 (Indonesia, Undang-Undang Tentang Pengampunan Pajak (Law on
Tax Amnesty), UU No.11 Tahun 2016 (Law Number 11 Year 2016)).
58
Mulyana, “KIP Sidangkan Setneg Soal Transparansi Pemberian Grasi”. Former Indonesian civil servant, personal interview; senior Indonesian lawyer, personal interview, Jakarta, Indonesia, 11 April 2013.
59
Indonesia, Peraturan Pemerintah Tentang Tata Cara Penyampaian Data Dan Inpormasi Oleh Instansi
Pemerintah Dan/Atau Lembaga Swasta Dalam Pencegahan Dan Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Pencucian
Uang (Government Regulation about Procedures for Submission of Data and Information by Government
Institutions and / or Private Institutions in Prevention and Eradication of Criminal Money Laundering), PP
No.2 Tahun 2016 (Government Regulation Number 2 Year 2016).
The following list of justifications for clemency, based on media reports, therefore contains a sampling
bias. Typically, clemency appeals from death row convicts or foreign nationals, are covered in detail in the
Indonesian and international media, whereas the clemency appeals of Indonesian petitioners accused of
lesser crimes receive far less attention.
60
Denny Indrayana, Indonesian Constitutional Reform 1999-2002: An Evaluation of ConstitutionMaking in Transition (Jakarta: Kompas, 2008), pp.149-150; Former member of the Indonesian National
Human Rights Commission, personal interview, Jakarta, Indonesia, 8 October 2016; Don Greenlees, “Coup
Leaders Kept in Prison,” The Australian (18 August 1998).
61
See infra Part IV.
62
e.g. Michael Vincent, “Corby clemency good for Bali Nine: expert,” ABC News (23 May 2012),
accessed 17 September 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-23/corby-clemency-good-for-bali-
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c. to encourage reciprocal clemency grants for Indonesians on death row
abroad;63

d. to privilege mitigating factors such as disability, old age, youth or psychiatric
illness;64
e. to take account of good behaviour in prison and expressed remorse;65

f. to recognise a disparity between sentences requested by prosecutors and
sentences imposed by judges;66
g. the prisoner being a drug ‘mule’ rather than a large scale trafficker;67
h. the prisoner’s motives in committing the crime;68
i. strong public support for the prisoner;69

j. the prisoner’s previous contribution to society;70
k. possible provocation in a murder case;71 and,

l. any lingering doubts over the prisoner’s guilt short of that which would justify
a full exoneration.72

Sometimes, more than one of these listed reasons have motivated a president to
grant clemency in a single case. The only legislative guidance is the general elucidation

nine-says-expert/4027542; Former Indonesian civil servant, personal interview.
63
e.g. “Clemency for drug convicts part of diplomatic effort, says govt,” The Jakarta Post (19 October
2012).
64
e.g. Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, “President Commutes Oki’s Sentence to Life,” The Jakarta Post (31
October 2003); Dessy Sagita, “Indonesia Not Alone in Death Penalty Reticence,” Jakarta Globe (17 October
2012); Greenlees, “Coup Leaders Kept in Prison,”; Erwida Maulia, “President to grant clemency for 500
kids,” The Jakarta Post (19 February 2010); Arry Anggadha, “Grasi Syaukani, Kemanusiaan vs Keadilan,”
VIVAnews (23 August 2010), accessed 26 January 2017, http://fokus.news.viva.co.id/news/read/172606grasi-syaukani-kemanusiaan-vs-keadilan.
65
e.g. Daniel Pascoe, “Three Coming Legal Challenges to Indonesia’s Death Penalty Regime,”
Indonesian Journal of International and Comparative Law 2, no.2 (2015): 272; Greenlees, “Coup Leaders
Kept in Prison”; Margareth Aritonang and Bagus Saragih, “Drug dealer clemency ‘a setback’,” The Jakarta
Post (13 October 2012).
66
e.g. “Bali Nine: Joko Widodo grants clemency to death row inmates convicted of murder,” The Australian (17 March 2005), accessed 17 September 2016, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/
bali-nine-joko-widodo-grants-clemency-to-death-row-inmates-convicted-of-murder/news-story/2d39a1
504ffcb3e984c8e22cdb34dbe0.
67
e.g. Aritonang and Saragih, “Drug dealer clemency”.
68
e.g. Sagita, “Indonesia Not Alone in Death Penalty Reticence”; Bagus Saragih, “SBY approves clemency for 19 drug convicts,” The Jakarta Post (17 October 2012).
69
e.g. relating to the Eva Susanti Bande case.
70
e.g. “Inilah Dosa-dosa Syaukani yang Diampuni Presiden?” Kompasiana Blog, comment posted 25
August 2010, accessed 26 January 2017, http://www.kompasiana.com/harrybudiyanto/inilah-dosa-dosasyaukani-yang-diampuni-presiden_55001b8ca33311307250fb04.
71
e.g. “Dua Terpidana Mati Dapat Grasi dari Presiden Jokowi,” Seruu (12 May 2016), accessed 17
September 2016, http://utama.seruu.com/read/2016/05/12/282865/dua-terpidana-mati-dapat-grasidari-presiden-jokowi.
72
Former Indonesian civil servant, personal interview. Another interview source stated that, despite
Indonesian law’s view of clemency as forgiveness for guilt (see infra n 89-90), it is sometimes granted in
cases of innocence, for pragmatic reasons (Indonesian NGO staff #2, personal interview).
Under President Suharto, there was at least one occasion where clemency was granted for wrongful
conviction, given possible innocence: see Amnesty International, Indonesia: A Briefing on the Death Penalty,
AI-Index: ASA 21/040/2004 (30 September 2004), accessed 24 September 2016, https://www.amnesty.
org/en/documents/asa21/040/2004/en/, p.9.
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to the 2002 Clemency Law’s amending statute (Law 5/2010),73 which provides only
negative examples of cases where the president should be hesitant:
in issuing a decision in relation to a clemency application, the president needs
to wisely and judiciously consider … cases where the crime has been commission
repeatedly, is a crime against morality and crimes that are sadistic or
premeditated in nature.74

Elsewhere,75 I have suggested that, based on the limited statistical information
available, various Indonesian presidents have granted clemency at ‘medium’ rates in
death penalty cases. Approximately 24-33 percent of death row prisoners received
clemency from 1975 to 2013 (with the remainder being executed). Statistics on how
often the various Indonesian presidents have exercised the clemency power in noncapital cases remain unavailable, although a 2017 media report asserted that the
Indonesian Supreme Court had given its advice to the president on 548 clemency
cases from 2010 to 2015 – around 90 cases per year.76

Unsurprisingly, given its wider impact, amnesty has been used more sparingly
by Indonesian presidents over the decades. During the Sukarno and Suharto
administrations, only six amnesty decrees were promulgated between 1954 and
1998, most benefiting separatists who had pursued rebellions against Indonesia’s
territorial integrity.77 In these cases, Sukarno’s and Suharto’s amnesty decrees were
granted for the sake of national unity. The most prominent cases of amnesty in the postSuharto era have also involved separatist rebels and activists. President B.J. Habibie
released around 230 political prisoners (including imprisoned separatist leaders
from East Timor, Papua and Aceh) through 12 separate executive decrees as a part
of Indonesia’s democratisation process during 1998 and 1999, to signal a break from
Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime.78 Of these prisoners, official figures indicate that at least
48 directly benefited from amnesty, as opposed to other forms of leniency, including
clemency.79 Then, in 2005, pursuant to a peace treaty, President Yudhoyono signed
a decree granting amnesty and abolition to 1424 persons involved in the Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, or ‘GAM’), whether they had been imprisoned
for offences such as treason, were under investigation or were being prosecuted, or
whether they had never previously been subject to criminal proceedings.80 Both of
these post-Reformasi acts of presidential leniency have been feted as successful and
appropriate uses of executive powers in dealing with politiReturning to the present
Indonesian administration, Jokowi’s final two options to release political prisoners
See infra n 91, and associated text.
Indonesian Law 5/2010, on Amendments to Law 22/2002 on Clemency, Elucidation section. trans.
75
Daniel Pascoe, “Clemency in Southeast Asian Death Penalty Cases,” Centre for Indonesian Law,
Islam and Society Policy Papers 1 (2014): 5.
76
Abdul Aziz, “Grasi-Grasi yang Diberikan Jokowi dan SBY,” Tirto.id (25 January 2017), accessed 27
January 2017, https://tirto.id/grasi-grasi-yang-diberikan-jokowi-dan-sby-chEU. The yearly figures are as
follows: 309 cases in 2010, 57 in 2011, 11 in 2012, 51 in 2013, 82 in 2014 and 38 in 2015.
77
Harison Citrawan, “The Past is Another Country: Designing Amnesty Law for Past Human Rights
Violators,” Indonesia Law Review 6, no. 2 (2016): 233-235.
78
Daniel Pascoe, “Jokowi’s dilemma: amnesty or clemency for political prisoners?” Indonesia at
Melbourne Blog (20 July 2015), accessed 17 September 2016, http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.
edu.au/jokowis-dilemma-amnesty-or-clemency-for-political-prisoners/; Anthony Goldstone, East Timor:
A Difficult Transition, WRITENET Paper 12/1999 (May 1999), accessed 26 January 2017, http://www.
refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6a6c7c.pdf, p.6.
79
Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights, “Amnesti Indonesia Dataset”.
80
Renée Jeffery, “Amnesty and Accountability: The Price of Peace in Aceh, Indonesia,” The International
Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 1 (2012): 73.
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are by using remisi (sentence remissions) and/or conditional release (pembebasan
bersyarat – equivalent to parole). Both powers are regulated by Law 12/1995
on Corrections and the latter further by the Indonesian Criminal Code. Granted
on Indonesia’s Independence Day (17 August) each year as General Remissions
and also on various religious holidays throughout the year as Special Remissions,
sentence remissions function as a statutory means of rewarding good behaviour in
prison, of reducing prison overcrowding, as well as celebrating important national
events,81 and more implicitly, as a means of endearing prisoners and the public to
the administration. Many thousands of prisoners who have each served at least six
months of their sentences are granted sentence remissions every year in Indonesia.82
Whether remissions are granted as General Remissions or Special Remissions, the
discount on the prisoner’s sentence will be between four percent and seventeen
percent of the total, and will never constitute more than a six-month reduction.83
Conditional release, on the other hand, allows prisoners to be released after
completing, at a minimum, two-thirds of the original sentence, or nine months’
incarceration – whichever is of greater length.84 Lindsey and Nicholson describe the
criteria for obtaining and maintaining conditional release. The prisoner must have
exhibited:
[G]ood behaviour in the previous nine months and have participated in
rehabilitation activities with enthusiasm and diligence. The community must
also ‘be able to accept’ the inmate… conditional release may be revoked if there
are indications that the crime will be repeated or the person in question breaks
the law, fails to report to prison officials on three consecutive occasions, fails to
report a change in address, does not participate in a development program set
by prison officials, or ‘causes unrest in the community’ (menimbulkan keresahan
dalam masyarakat).85
Although the Indonesian president does not possess a direct constitutional
prerogative to grant remissions or conditional release, these remain legal options by
which Jokowi, through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights,86 could arrange the
release of Indonesia’s remaining political prisoners. The current Minister of Law
and Human Rights, Yasonna Laoly, is a member of Jokowi’s political party (Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan: Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle, or PDI-P)
and has a close working relationship with the president.
Having outlined the legal options available to the Indonesian president to achieve
reconciliation with separatist rebel groups, in the following section I consider the
benefits and drawbacks of each possible approach. Unfortunately, none of the four
preceding options provides a straightforward solution.

Lindsey and Nicholson, Drugs Law and Legal Practice in Southeast Asia, p.108.
Ibid., pp.108-109.
83
For a full list, see ibid., p.109.
84
Indonesia, Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (Indonesian Criminal Code), art. 15(1); Indonesia,
Undang-Undang Tentang Pemasyarakatan (Law on Corrections), UU No. 12 Tahun 1995 (Law Number 12
Year 1995), art. 14(1)(k); ibid., p.109.
85
Lindsey and Nicholson, Drugs Law and Legal Practice in Southeast Asia, pp.110-112.
86
Indonesia, Keputusan Presiden Tentang Remisi (Presidential Decision on Remission), No. 174 Tahun
1999 (Indonesian Presidential Decision Number 174 Year 1999); Indonesia, Peraturan Menteri Hukum Dan
Hak Asasi Manusia Tentang Syarat Dan Tata Cara Pemberian Remisi, Asimilasi, Cuti Mengunjungi Keluarga,
Pembebasan Bersyarat, Cuti Menjelang Bebas, Dan Cuti Bersyarat (Regulation of the Minister of Law and Human Rights on the Conditions and Procedures for Remission, Assimilation, Family Leave, Conditional Release,
Leave Approaching Release and Conditional Leave), No. 21 Tahun 2013 (Indonesian Minister of Law and
Human Rights Regulation Number 21 Year 2013).
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IV. DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDONESIA’S REMAINING POLITICAL
PRISONERS

In considering his legal options to release Indonesia’s remaining political prisoners,
President Jokowi now faces difficult choices. As I describe below, executive clemency
(grasi) under Article 14 of the 1945 Constitution, while allowing for a prisoner’s
release, implicitly requires the recipient to acknowledge his or her guilt for the offence
pardoned or where the punishment is commuted. Nevertheless, prisoners such as Eva
Susanti Bande (an agrarian activist convicted for inciting violence), Schapelle Corby
(drug trafficking), Antasari Azhar (murder), and Fabianus Tibo, Marinus Riwu, and
Dominggus da Silva (jointly convicted and later executed for murder) all attempted
to publicly maintain their innocence while simultaneously petitioning the president
for clemency.87 Although there is no explicit requirement to acknowledge guilt in the
Indonesian Constitution or the implementing legislation on clemency (Law 22/2002
and Law 5/2010), both laws clearly define clemency as a form of official forgiveness
(pengampunan) for punishment imposed by a court of law.88 Furthermore, in the
elucidation section to Law 22/2002, clemency is described as a ‘gift from the
president in the form of forgiveness… Thus, the granting of clemency is not a technical
issue of justice and is not a [re]assessment of the judge’s decision.’89 Although the
elucidation section is not technically part of each Indonesian statute, courts use these
as influential and often determinative aids to statutory interpretation.90
As I described in section II above, criminal justice theorists tend to agree that
granting ‘forgiveness’ is only possible (whether by an individual victim or by the
state) in cases of guilt – where wrongdoing has been proven or admitted. Given the
Indonesian understanding of clemency based exclusively on forgiveness, a factually
innocent and wrongly imprisoned defendant therefore faces pressure to implicitly
acknowledge guilt for an offence he or she did not commit, in order to benefit from
a reduced or abrogated sentence.91 This was evidently the bargain made by Bande,
Corby, Tibo (when petitioning), and possibly other clemency beneficiaries in
Indonesia, or at least the impression these defendants chose to give the outside world
as they continued to protest their innocence as they appealed for merciful treatment.

87
Pascoe, “Jokowi’s dilemma”; Ali Kotarumalos, “3 Christians on death row for killing Muslims seek
presidential pardon,” Associated Press Newswires (28 August 2006); Fachrul Sidiq, “Antasari did not plead
guilty to earn clemency: lawyer,” The Jakarta Post (26 January 2017), accessed 27 January 2017, http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/26/antasari-did-not-plead-guilty-to-earn-clemency-lawyer.
html.
88
See Indonesia, Undang-Undang Tentang Grasi (Law on Clemency), UU No. 22 Tahun 2002 (Law
Number 22 Year 2002), preamble, art. 1; Indonesia, Undang-Undang Tentang Perubahan Atas UndangUndang Nomor 22 Tahun 2002 Tentang Grasi (Law Regarding Amendments to Law No. 22/2002 on Clemency), UU No.5 Tahun 2010 (Law Number 5 Year 2010), preamble. A reference in the latter preamble to
clemency for forgiveness and/or justice and human rights might open a small window to allow for clemency
as revocation of guilt. However, the legislation may also simply be referring to clemency granted on a
retributive basis for undeserved excessive punishment, rather than the conviction itself being undeserved.
The fact that the predecessor law, Undang-Undang Permohonan Grasi (Law on Clemency Applications),
UU No.3 Tahun 1950 (Law Number 3 Year 1950), failed to mention forgiveness at all may explain why
President Suharto was able to grant at least one prisoner grasi on the basis of innocence (see supra n 72).
89
‘Grasi, pada dasarnya, pemberian dari Presiden dalam bentuk pengampunan… Dengan demikian,
pemberian grasi bukan merupakan persoalan teknis yuridis peradilan dan tidak terkait dengan penilaian
terhadap putusan hakim.’
90
Simon Butt, “Regional Autonomy and Legal Disorder: The Proliferation of Local Laws in Indonesia,”
Sydney Law Review 32 (2010): 180 n 24.
91
Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy and the Public Interest, p.194.
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In summary, within the Indonesian constitutional scheme, clemency is an executive
edict to reduce or abrogate lawfully-imposed punishment, rather than a means to
overturn a judicial finding of guilt and declare innocence based on new arguments or
evidence. The implicit effect of the term pengampunan (forgiveness) in the two most
recent clemency laws and in the elucidation section of Law 22/2002 is to preclude
clemency being employed as a ‘free pardon’ bestowing innocence on the recipient.
Although other jurisdictions may grant pardons for innocence,92 in Indonesia the law
seems to foreclose the possibility. Instead, for these purposes the Peninjauan Kembali
(‘PK’, or case review) procedure is usually utilised.93 Since the 1970s, PK has become
the regular means of post-conviction review in Indonesia, exercised by the Indonesian
Supreme Court after regular cassation appeals have failed.94 Prisoners who proceed
to petition the president for clemency are publicly perceived as admitting guilt, and
as pleading for leniency in punishment only.
The implication is that, arguably, in May 2015 each of the five Papuan clemency
recipients at least implicitly acknowledged responsibility for their crimes by
accepting release from prison (although it remains unclear whether they submitted
clemency petitions to the president themselves, or were pardoned unilaterally, as is
now permitted by Law 5/2010).95 There is no public record of their views on this
implicit admission of guilt, although one interview source noted that the five men
released had all received legal advice beforehand on the consequences of accepting
executive clemency.96
Similar cases have led to contrasting results. In 2010, President Yudhoyono,
Jokowi’s predecessor, also succeeded in granting clemency to two Papuan political
activists jailed for raising the banned ‘Morning Star’ flag and for taking part in a proindependence rally that turned violent.97 However, on the basis that it would require
an admission of guilt, dozens of other Papuan prisoners offered clemency refused
to be released on the same occasion.98 In August 2013, a further unilateral attempt
at granting large-scale clemency to Papuan political prisoners by Yudhoyono failed,
as the prisoners concerned again refused to acknowledge guilt for crimes that they
say they did not commit.99 Among the group refusing clemency in 2013 was Filep
Karma, at the time the most well-known Papuan political prisoner, who was given
a 15 year sentence in 2004 for raising the banned ‘Morning Star’ flag at a protest.100

See supra n 17.
Lindsey and Nicholson, Drugs Law and Legal Practice in Southeast Asia, p. 85.
94
Tim Lindsey, ed., Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Federation Press, 2008), p. 349.
95
See Indonesia, Undang-Undang Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 22 Tahun 2002
Tentang Grasi (Law Regarding Amendments to Law No. 22/2002 on Clemency), UU No.5 Tahun 2010 (Law
Number 5 Year 2010), art. 6A. One interviewee asserted that President Widodo initiated the process himself (Indonesian NGO staff #3, personal interview).
96
Indonesian Academic Expert, personal telephone interview, 19 January 2017.
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Niniek Karmini, “Indonesia Political Prisoners in Papua Reject Amnesty Plan,” The Irrawady (4 June
2013), accessed 29 January 2017, http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/asia/indonesia-political-prisonersin-papua-reject-amnesty-plan.html.
98
Ryan Dagur, “Papua prisoners snub clemency offer,” UCA News (3 June 2013), accessed 21
September 2016, http://www.ucanews.com/news/papua-prisoners-snub-clemency-offer/68410.
99
This case demonstrates that even clemency offered unilaterally may be refused by the intended
recipients (see Undang-Undang Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 22 Tahun 2002 Tentang
Grasi (Law Regarding Amendments to Law No. 22/2002 on Clemency), UU No.5 Tahun 2010 (Law Number
5 Year 2010), art. 6A).
100
Amnesty International, After a Decade in Jail for Raising a Flag, Filep Karma is Released (19
November 2015), accessed 21 September 2016, http://blog.amnestyusa.org/asia/after-a-decade-in-jail92
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Furthermore, many of the Moluccan prisoners who still remain incarcerated in 2017
have refused grasi from successive Indonesian presidents for the same reason.101
Given such prisoners’ reluctance to accept presidential clemency, as far back as
2011 Indonesia’s Human Rights Commission (KOMNAS HAM) recommended using
the amnesty power to release political prisoners.102 More recently, in 2015, New
York-based NGO Human Rights Watch demanded that ‘The Indonesian government
should release all political prisoners with an immediate presidential amnesty rather
than demand prisoners admit “guilt” for convictions that violated their basic human
rights’.103

As KOMNAS HAM and Human Rights Watch have suggested, based on its historical
and theoretical rationale, granting amnesty for political prisoners in order to signal
a break from the past, to facilitate societal ‘healing’ and to encourage constructive
dialogue with separatist rebel groups appears the more appropriate choice for Jokowi,
rather than attempting to make further grants of clemency.104 Granting amnesty (in
addition to abolisi (abolition) for prisoners whose cases are still pending in the court
system) would release the beneficiaries from prison, would not necessarily imply guilt
(as Indonesia’s constitutional scheme fails to recognise conditional amnesty), and
would return the political prisoners to a position as if they had not been convicted in
the first place, by ‘forgetting’ rather than ‘forgiving’. A blanket amnesty and abolition
grant would certainly be preferable for most of the prisoners themselves.105 However,
the major hurdle here is that granting amnesty would require that the president pay
heed to the advice of the DPR, as noted above. Acting contrary to the Supreme Court’s
confidential advice is one thing, but ignoring the legislature’s publicly-aired views is
entirely another. Herein lies Jokowi’s dilemma.
Although it is not mandatory for the Indonesian president to follow the
constitutional advice of other government branches106 (and there certainly have been
cases where previous presidents have ignored the advice of the Supreme Court in

for-raising-a-flag-filep-karma-is-freed/.
101
Indonesian NGO staff #3, personal interview.
102
Former member of the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, personal interview;
“Komnas HAM pertimbangkan ajukan amnesti Tapol/Napol Papua,” UCA News (3 December 2012), accessed 25 January 2017, http://indonesia.ucanews.com/2012/12/03/komnas-ham-pertimbangkan-ajukan-amnesti-tapolnapol-papua/.
103
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granting or rejecting clemency),107 disregarding the advice on amnesty of the DPR’s
Commission III (on Legal Affairs, Laws, Human Rights and Security) is an unlikely
move for a relatively inexperienced president with a limited legislative mandate,
both in 2015 when the PDI-P led a minority government, but also since July 2016
when support from the Golkar party gifted Jokowi’s bloc a legislative majority for
the first time.108 In justifying the president’s decision to grant clemency rather than
amnesty to the five Papuan prisoners in May 2015, the Minister of Law and Human
Rights Yasonna Laoly stated ‘We are concerned about the political process at the
House’.109 Then, as Laoly foreshadowed, in late June 2015 DPR lawmakers failed to
give support to Jokowi’s further proposals to grant amnesty to remaining political
prisoners due to fears of legitimising the Free Papua Movement, and the perceived
risk that the beneficiaries of such amnesty would incite disaffection for the Indonesian
administration in Papua and West Papua provinces upon their release.110 The DPR’s
position on amnesty has remained the same since Golkar joined PDI-P in coalition,
and by January 2017 the Indonesian legislature had stopped discussing the issue at
all.111

It appears incongruous then that in July 2016 the DPR endorsed amnesty for up to
70 members of a former Acehnese rebel group, with the proposed amnesty comprising
prisoner releases of former rebels ‘who have obtained [final] legal status,’112 and is
‘aimed at showing the international community that Indonesia [can also] take a soft
approach to rebels and respect human rights’.113 With the internationally-mediated
Helsinki MoU of August 2005 paving the way for presidential amnesty and abolition
to former GAM combatants,114 perhaps the DPR feels that the present Acehnese group
pose less of a threat to the Indonesian state’s continued unity than, for example,
OPM independence activists, given the ongoing hostilities between the OPM and
the Indonesian government. By contrast, former GAM members are now active in
Acehnese provincial politics, having laid down their weapons pursuant to the 2005
MoU.115 Given that Yudhoyono’s original amnesty decree was not intended to cover:
107
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‘members of GAM who had committed [non-political] criminal acts or those who
continued to carry out acts of rebellion after the date of the signing of the [2005]
Helsinki accord,’116 the present group of beneficiaries would require a separate legal
instrument. Nevertheless, by January 2017 Jokowi had not approved and issued the
DPR’s proposed amnesty decree for this GAM ‘splinter group’.

As noted above, Jokowi’s final option is to release political prisoners through
sentence remissions and/or conditional release, each issued under the direction of
the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Remissions may be granted to all prisoners,
including political prisoners, in accordance with Law 12/1995 on Corrections.
However, from the Papuan and Moluccan prisoners’ point of view, remissions and
conditional release are, in effect, no different from receiving clemency. The prisoner’s
original conviction is unaffected and his or her guilt remains. Therefore, it was a
surprise when Filep Karma was granted (and accepted) remissions so as to be released
from prison in November 2015, after serving 11 years of a 15 year sentence.117 Karma’s
method of release was, in one sense, no different from the executive clemency that he
had previously turned down. Whatever Karma and his supporters may now say in
the media,118 to the Indonesian public, early release does not erase guilt or vindicate
Karma’s political positions.
Furthermore, the relevant legislation sets out a strict schedule for remissions based
on the length of time already served.119 If Jokowi wished to accelerate the release of
certain prisoners in the name of reconciliation, there is little he could achieve quickly
using remissions, particularly for prisoners serving longer-term sentences, given
the maximum discount on sentence only stands at six months.120 Conditional release
is a much quicker means of releasing political prisoners serving longer sentences,
provided they have served at least two-thirds of the head sentence. The main barrier
to receiving conditional release in treason or rebellion cases is the requirement to
demonstrate remorse,121 thereby placing a potential recipient on the same guilty
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footing as a prisoner who accepts presidential clemency. Nevertheless, over the past
few years, the decline in numbers of political prisoners incarcerated has largely come
about via conditional release, remissions, and prisoners completing their sentences
in the entirety,122 as opposed to the clemency and amnesty options discussed in this
article.
V. CONCLUSION
From the perspective of the Papuan and Moluccan political prisoners, the pressing
dilemma is how to achieve release from prison and re-join their families, while not a)
legitimising the penal laws and the Indonesian security apparatus that placed them
there in the first place, and in some cases, not b) admitting factual guilt for the offences
charged. Prisoners such as Filep Karma might proudly admit that they carried out acts
prohibited by the Indonesian state (e.g., raising the Morning Star flag123) but would
still be loath to endorse these laws as just laws by petitioning for forgiveness. In 2013,
Karma admitted as much when he was quoted within prison stating: ‘I will only accept
an unconditional release … I did not commit any crime when I raised the Morning Star
flag in 2004’.124 In effect, Karma was advocating for presidential amnesty.

For Indonesia’s present political prisoners, to accept presidential clemency risks
failure on both counts. To be released through remissions or conditional release does
likewise. All three are solutions ‘within the system’ that fail to take account of the
prisoners’ true preferences and their rejection of that system. Clearly the best solution
from the prisoners’ perspective is presidential amnesty, combined with abolition
for those defendants whose cases are still pending. Amnesty itself does not repeal
the laws used to censor and punish independence activists, but at least it serves to
denote reconciliation and dialogue as higher values than retributive justice based on
Indonesia’s positive criminal law.
However, from Jokowi’s perspective, granting amnesty unilaterally (while legally
possible), would anger his parliamentary backers and is an unlikely political step
during his first five-year term as president (2014-2019). Clemency, remissions and
conditional release remain the politically more straightforward options, and these
were still being considered by the Indonesian executive as of 2016.125 Significantly,
unlike the 2005 Helsinki MoU concluded with Acehnese rebel group GAM, the
Indonesian government and the separatist rebel groups from which the remaining
Papuan and Moluccan political prisoners derive are not presently bound by any
bilateral peace treaty. Even if an attempt at treaty negotiations were made, it is even
uncertain whether the Indonesian government would find an authoritative negotiating
partner amongst the OPM and RMS movements, given their scattered leadership.126
The DPR’s continuing concern is whether unconditional amnesty legitimises
separatism and undermines the state’s ethnic unity. Looking to Indonesia’s previous
state practice on amnesty, together with the theoretical literature, this article
suggests that unconditional amnesty has neither of those effects. As noted above,
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amnesties have been frequently granted to separatist groups throughout Indonesia’s
independent history as a peacebuilding measure. In no previous case has a direct link
been established between an amnesty grant and a subsequent upsurge in separatist
violence, with one interviewee noting that, historically, most amnesty recipients
have not returned to political activities at all.127 Here, the amnesty recommended
in July 2016 for up to 70 members of a breakaway Acehnese rebel group is highly
significant, demonstrating that current members of the DPR’s Commission III are
not intransient, given the right arguments and incentives are put forward. Jokowi’s
best solution may be to convince Commission members from his own multi-party
coalition to recommend amnesty as a forward looking measure to preserve peaceable
relationships with Indonesia’s citizens and with international allies, rather than
a backwards looking move which appears to legitimise separatist movements by
removing the burden of punishment.128 Here, the language the president uses in the
media and in the resulting amnesty decree itself will become critically important.
Referring to Indonesian presidents’ long history in utilising Article 14(2) of the 1945
Constitution as a peacebuilding measure, alongside the theoretical basis for amnesty
laws and practice around the world, is one means of encouraging compromise on all
sides.

127
128

Former member of the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, personal interview.
Stokkom, Doorn and Tongeren, “Public Forgiveness,” p.9.
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